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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This paper  studies  the  health  effects  of one  of  the world’s  largest  demand-side  ﬁnancial  incentive
programmes—India’s  Janani  Suraksha  Yojana.  Our  difference-in-difference  estimates  exploit  hetero-
geneity  in  the  implementation  of  the ﬁnancial  incentive  programme  across  districts.  We  ﬁnd  that  cash
incentives  to women  were  associated  with  increased  uptake  of  maternity  services  but  there  is  no  strong
evidence  that  the  JSY  was  associated  with  a reduction  in  neonatal  or  early  neonatal  mortality.  The  pos-
itive  effects  on utilisation  are  larger  for less  educated  and  poorer  women,  and  in  places  where  the cash
payment  was  most  generous.  We  also  ﬁnd  evidence  of  unintended  consequences.  The  ﬁnancial  incen-
tive  programme  was  associated  with  a  substitution  away  from  private  health  providers,  an increase  in
breastfeeding  and  more  pregnancies.  These  ﬁndings  demonstrate  the  potential  for  ﬁnancial  incentives  toeywords:
ash incentives
emand-side ﬁnancing
ealth-seeking behaviour
aternal health
have  unanticipated  effects  that  may,  in  the case  of  fertility,  undermine  the programme’s  own  objective
of  reducing  mortality.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ndia
. Introduction
One of the main challenges for global health is to identify poli-
ies and strategies that improve the health of women and children
United Nations, 2010). The traditional focus of much of the medical
iterature has been on intervention research resulting in unprece-
ented knowledge on what health technologies work (Bhutta et al.,
008; Campbell and Graham, 2006; Jones et al., 2003). Never before
ave policymakers in developing countries had such a wealth of
vidence at their disposal. Indeed, countries that achieved univer-
al coverage of life-saving interventions have seen rapid reductions
n mortality. For example, over the past two decades Thailand, Viet-
am and Sri Lanka have developed a comprehensive primary health
are system. All these countries between 1990 and 2006 witnessed
verage yearly reductions in under ﬁve mortality of over 5% (Rohde
 We  thank Arnab Acharya and Marcos Vera-Hernandez for helpful comments on
n  earlier draft of this article. We are grateful to Billy Stewart for his guidance and
upport during this project. This study was funded by UKaid from the Department
or  International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reﬂect the
epartment’s ofﬁcial policies. All errors are our own.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0 20 7927 2974.
E-mail address: Timothy.Powell-Jackson@lshtm.ac.uk (T. Powell-Jackson).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.07.001
167-6296/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).et al., 2008). Yet across the developing world more broadly there
are large gaps in coverage, particularly amongst the poorest (Bhutta
et al., 2010). A key question then is whether there are policies that
can be introduced within health systems – termed here health sys-
tem interventions – which can be shown to improve uptake of
priority health services.
In an effort to improve population coverage of health inter-
ventions and narrow the differences between income groups,
policymakers in developing countries are becoming increasingly
bold in their reforms. One promising strategy is to provide ﬁnan-
cial incentives to individuals who  exhibit certain behaviours that
improve health1. This is the key feature of various programmes that
have become popular in recent years. Whether the incentive takes
the form of conditional cash transfers, vouchers or one-off cash
payments, the central idea of providing monetary rewards condi-
tional on measurable actions is the same. Financial incentives have
courted considerable controversial, with views ranging from “as
1 In this paper we are interested in demand-side ﬁnancial incentives, rather than
provider payment mechanisms such as pay-for-performance. The latter reward
physicians for improvements in quality of care and other measures, and are popular
in  the US and UK. For brevity, we will use the term ﬁnancial or cash incentives in
health to refer to schemes that target the users of health care.
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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times lower than some of the worst performing northern Indian
states (Registrar General of India, 2013). National surveys show
that institutional deliveries have increased modestly over time
but a large proportion of women continue to give birth at homeT. Powell-Jackson et al. / Journal o
lose as you can come to a magic bullet” to a “form of bribery”
Dugger, 2004; Marteau et al., 2009). Critics point to the theoretical
ossibility of unintended consequences as well as moral concerns
ver their use, particularly in a health setting.
This paper studies the early effects of one of the largest cash
ncentive programmes for health in the world. With an annual
xpenditure of 8.8 billion rupees or $207 million, and an esti-
ated 7.1 million individual beneﬁciaries2, India’s national Janani
uraksha Yojana (JSY) provides cash to women who  give birth in a
ealth facility. The JSY provides an ideal testing ground to exam-
ne the effects of ﬁnancial incentives on health. Although ofﬁcially
aunched in 2005, implementation of the JSY across districts was
ncremental, providing variation in its coverage. At the same time,
uch of the health policy environment in India is common within
tates, which gives us more conﬁdence that district variation in the
SY is not acting as a proxy for other policy initiatives. A second
dvantage of this setting is the narrow focus of the JSY on women
t childbirth. This provides greater scope for examining unintended
onsequences of the ﬁnancial incentives on closely related but non-
ncentivised behaviours. A third advantage is the scale at which the
SY was implemented. This differentiates our study from carefully
ontrolled small scale (incentive) experiments, whose external
alidity has at times been questioned (Deaton, 2010).
We identify the effect of the JSY on health care seeking behaviour
nd health status by exploiting the substantial variation in imple-
entation of the JSY across districts. Using data on women who
ave birth between 2001 and 2008 from two rounds of India’s Dis-
rict Level Health Survey (DLHS), our empirical approach examines
hether the JSY can account for cross-district patterns in health
are utilisation and health status over time. In estimating the effect
f the JSY, this difference-in-difference strategy allows us to control
or time invariant unobservables at the district level that inﬂuence
tudy outcomes and are correlated with the expansion of the JSY.
sing changes in the intensity of the JSY to identify programme
mpacts, nevertheless, gives rise to endogeneity concerns. Early
dopters of the JSY, for example, may  have been districts that were
ighly motivated to make improvements in maternal health ser-
ices. While we provide extensive robustness checks on our main
ndings, we are unable to rule out the possibility of confounding
nd refrain from making strong claims of causality.
Our results show that the JSY was associated with an increase
n the proportion of women  who give birth in a public health facil-
ty. Estimates suggest the magnitude of this effect was reasonably
odest. The positive association between the JSY and women giv-
ng birth in a public health facility was driven almost entirely by
ncreases in the use of primary health centres and community
ealth centres, providers offering more basic services than those
vailable at the district hospital. In addition, we  present evidence
n the effect of the JSY on health outcomes, ﬁnding no strong evi-
ence of an effect on either neonatal mortality (deaths within 28
ays of birth) or one-day mortality (deaths within 24 h of birth). We
ote, however, that conﬁdence intervals are not sufﬁciently tight
o reject a modest effect of the JSY on these mortality outcomes.
We also provide evidence on a number of unintended conse-
uences. First, a lack of implementation of the JSY much beyond
he public sector means that the ﬁnancial incentives resulted in
omen substituting away from giving birth in the private sector.
econd, results show that the JSY had a positive, statistically sig-
iﬁcant effect on pregnancies. Third, we ﬁnd evidence of indirect
eneﬁts. Women  in JSY districts were more likely to start early
reastfeeding within one hour of childbirth.
2 These ﬁgures refer to 2007/2008, the ﬁnancial year closest to our study period.th Economics 43 (2015) 154–169 155
This paper contributes to the existing literature by reporting
more credible treatment effects than previous studies on the JSY.
Our main results are consistent with much of the evidence emerg-
ing from conditional cash transfer programmes and small scale
incentive experiments3. We  also go beyond the typical study of
ﬁnancial incentives in examining unintended consequences. Sim-
ilar to the ﬁndings from studies in Brazil (Morris et al., 2004b)
and Honduras (Morris et al., 2004a), we document evidence of
unintended effects, which highlight how important it is for pol-
icymakers to consider the full range of effects in the design
of ﬁnancial incentive schemes. More generally we connect to a
second literature evaluating the impact of health system interven-
tions and policies. This is a wide ranging and challenging area of
research (Mills et al., 2008), and one in which much of the exist-
ing econometric evidence focuses on the impact of health ﬁnancing
initiatives4.
Given that the JSY remains a high-proﬁle federal health pro-
gramme  in India, the ﬁndings are of relevance to policy. First, they
argue for much better administration of the programme. If dis-
bursement of the JSY cash were improved, the effect on use of
formal health care would be greater than at present. Second, the
ﬁndings reinforce the growing sentiment that demand-side inter-
vention by government can be effective in improving uptake of
health services but alone may  be insufﬁcient to improve health
outcomes. Strengthening the quality of primary health care and the
referral system in India is thus a critical complementary strategy,
as is staggering supply- and demand-side investments over time
such that individuals are encouraged to use services once quality
has improved. Third, the ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial incentives
may  be an imprecise tool for changing health-related behaviours.
They can have unintended health effects, on fertility for example,
which may  undermine the programme’s own objectives. Financial
incentives must therefore be used with caution.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the JSY
and addresses the theoretical predictions of its impact on health-
related behaviours. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main econometric
results and includes a discussion of robustness checks. Section 6
examines heterogeneity in the impact of the JSY, and Section 7
offers concluding comments.
2. Background
2.1. India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana
Despite the long history of well-intentioned family welfare poli-
cies and some recent progress, maternal and child mortality in
India remains high. With 72,000 maternal deaths, no other coun-
try accounts for a larger proportion of global mortality (Kassebaum
et al., 2014). Maternal mortality has fallen by 47% from 398 deaths
per 100,000 live births in 1997–1998 to 178 deaths per 100,000
live births in 2010–2012 (Registrar General of India, 2006, 2013).
However, the national picture masks enormous differences across
states. For example, Kerala’s maternal mortality rate is almost ﬁve3 The systematic literature reviews on conditional cash transfers (Lagarde et al.,
2007) and demand-side incentives in health (Murray et al., 2014) provide a detailed
summary of much of this evidence.
4 See, for example, studies on health insurance (Babiarz et al., 2010; Finkelstein
et al., 2011; King et al., 2009; Manning et al., 1987; Thornton et al., 2010; Wagstaff
et al., 2009).
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International Institute for Population Sciences, 1995; International
nstitute for Population Sciences and Macro International, 2007).
ven when women do reach a health facility to give birth, health
orkers are often absent (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Muralidharan
t al., 2011) and the quality of care they receive is low (Das and
ammer, 2006, 2007; Das et al., 2008).
It is against this background that the federal government
aunched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005. Key
lements of the programme include large investments in health
nfrastructure, the deployment of three quarters of a million newly
reated accredited social health activists as frontline health work-
rs in the community, strategies to stimulate demand for health
ervices, and decentralisation of the health system (Ministry of
ealth and Family Welfare, 2005). One of the more high proﬁle
omponents of the NRHM is the Janani Suraksha Yojana (translated
s “Safe Motherhood Scheme”). It was launched ofﬁcially in April
005, with the objective of improving maternal and neonatal health
hrough the promotion of institutional deliveries5. It provides a
ash incentive to women who give birth in a public health facil-
ty or, in principle, an accredited private health provider (Ministry
f Health and Family Welfare, 2006).
The JSY programme designates Indian states as low performing
r high performing, varying the cash amount to provide greater
ncentives in the area of higher priority. Speciﬁcally, women in low-
erforming states are offered 1400 Rs ($31) in rural areas and 1000
s ($22) in urban areas, and those in high-performing states are
iven 700 Rs ($16) in rural areas and 600 Rs ($13) in urban areas6.
o put these amounts in perspective, annual Gross National Income
er capita was $1000 in 2007 and the average amount paid for
elivery care in the public sector was $25 in 2004 (Bonu et al., 2009).
he cash payment is available to all women in the low-performing
tates; by contrast, it is offered in high-performing states only to
omen living in households below the poverty line, belonging to
cheduled castes and tribes, or those who have had two  or fewer
ive births. The policy stipulates that the cash is to be disbursed to
he mother immediately at the institution itself and within a week
f delivery.
To provide incentives for health workers who encourage women
o give birth in a formal care provider, accredited social health
orkers are offered a cash payment of between 200 Rs ($4) and
00 Rs ($13) for each delivery attended. The JSY also pays 500 Rs
$11) to women who give birth at home, conditional on less than
wo living children and a below the poverty line card, but since
his is a direct continuation of the cash assistance provided under
he National Maternity Beneﬁt Scheme, it does not represent an
dditional incentive for eligible women to stay at home for delivery.
.2. Anticipated effectsConsider a ﬁnancial incentive programme that rewards families
n which the woman  gives birth in a health facility7. Basic economic
5 Ethnographic research in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh casts doubt on the
overnment strategy to encourage institutional deliveries as a means to improve the
ealth of women. Jeffery and Jeffery (2010) argue that the context surrounding the
overnment provision of health care presents challenges that neither the NRHM nor
he  JSY were intended to address. Decades of mistrust of government health services
nd  controversial family planning programmes have left a credibility gap not easily
lled by offering ﬁnancial incentives and investing in new infrastructure. In line
ith a report by Human Rights Watch (2009), they contend that accountability of
overnment health providers to the population they serve is key and nothing less
han  “a dismantling of a long-standing political economy of health care provisionw¨ill
elp  to remedy the situation.
6 The low-performing states consist of Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar
radesh, Uttaranchal, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.
7 For a thorough discussion of the economic rationale of conditional cash transfers,
ee Fiszbein and Schady (2009).th Economics 43 (2015) 154–169
theory suggests short-term ﬁnancial incentives will increase
demand for maternal health care. Financial incentives provided to
women seeking care in the public sector only change the relative
prices of different care seeking options and are thus expected to
lead to a substitution away from private health providers and home
births (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990).
To the extent that public health providers can meet this increase
in demand, ﬁnancial incentives will increase utilisation of health
services. If instead public health providers are functioning at full
capacity or are unable to increase supply in the short-term, ﬁnan-
cial incentives will have little impact on utilisation. Moreover, there
may  be no overall increase in utilisation if the ﬁnancial incen-
tives contribute to crowding-out of the private sector. Whether an
increase in utilisation of public health services improves health out-
comes is not clear-cut, and will depend on differences in the clinical
quality of care between the various health care seeking choices. We
would expect the narrowest difference in quality to be between
public and private health providers, particularly in terms of clinical
as opposed to interpersonal dimensions of quality.
While the ﬁnancial rewards provide explicit incentives to use
maternal health services, implicitly they also serve to incentivise
pregnancy. This effect may  manifest itself in terms of a reduc-
tion in birth spacing or an increase in total lifetime children for
women who  otherwise would not have become pregnant. We  also
anticipate indirect effects as ﬁnancial incentives increase women’s
exposure to health information. Greater contact with health staff
exposes women  to more information on healthy behaviours con-
cerning the mother and her neonate. Behaviours shown to have
an impact on health outcomes include wrapping the baby within
30 min  of childbirth, initiating breastfeeding within one hour, and
dressing the cord with antiseptic (Darmstadt et al., 2005).
2.3. Evidence on the JSY
There have been a number of studies on the JSY, some of which
have collected primary household data (Hunter et al., 2014). For
the most part these have been descriptive, documenting progress
in the implementation of the programme (Devadasan et al., 2008;
Malini et al., 2008; Verma et al., 2010). By contrast, Lim et al. (2010)
make claims as to the causal effect of the JSY. Impact estimates
are based on three identiﬁcation strategies: individual-level match-
ing, a modiﬁed before and after design, and a two-period district
level difference-in-difference approach. The main conclusion from
the analysis is that the JSY increased substantially use of maternal
health care and reduced neonatal mortality.
The study by Lim et al. (2010) has several important limitations.
First, the headline results are based on the matching and modiﬁed
before and after design, while estimates from the difference-in-
difference analysis are given less emphasis on the basis that they
lack power. Having imprecise estimates from the district level
analysis does not provide justiﬁcation to highlight other methods
simply because they have more power. Second, individual match-
ing based on whether women did and did not receive the JSY cash
is unlikely to provide credible estimates of effect because there is
reverse causality (women receive the cash when they give birth in
a health facility) and individual unobservables correlated with out-
comes are likely to be important factors in determining who takes
up the programme. The modiﬁed before and after study design is
also problematic since it must rely again on the strong assump-
tion of conditional independence (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
Third, a strategy that controls for observables at the district level is
more credible because selection is now at the policy level where it
is likely to be based on observed measures of need. However, the
share of births in a district in which the woman received the JSY
cash is an inappropriate measure of treatment because it is mechan-
ically linked to the fraction of women giving birth in a facility. By
T. Powell-Jackson et al. / Journal of Health Economics 43 (2015) 154–169 157
Table  1
Descriptive statistics.
2001/2002–2004/2005 (Before JSY) 2005/2006–2007/2008 (During JSY)
Panel A. Study outcomes
Neonatal mortality (per 1000 live births) 33.0 26.6
One-day mortality (per 1000 live births) 16.1 13.0
Health  worker in attendance at delivery (%) 46.0 49.1
Delivery in a health facility (%) 38.7 43.7
Public  health provider (%) 20.0 25.5
Private health provider (%) 18.7 18.2
Caesarean section (%) 7.3 8.1
Assisted delivery (%) 2.6 1.8
At  least three antenatal care visits (%) 43.6 46.9
Breastfeeding within one hour of birth (%) 31.1 39.9
Pregnant in a given year (%) – 7.7
Panel  B. Individual covariates
Urban (%) 26.1 18.3
Hindu (%) 76.3 76.0
Scheduled caste (%) 18.4 19.0
Scheduled tribe (%) 16.7 17.6
Other  backward caste/tribe (%) 40.0 40.6
Maternal age (years) 24.6 25.0
Number of live births 2.64 2.54
Woman’s education (grades completed) 4.36 4.47
Husband’s education (grades completed) 6.66 6.62
Household wealth asset (score) −0.018 −0.053
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2% had an assisted delivery with forceps or a ventouse, neither of
which changed much over time. By contrast, use of antenatal care
and breastfeeding improved over time. The proportion of womenotes: Summary statistics are based on data from the DLHS-2 and DLHS-3, including 
ost  recent delivery, except in the case of neonatal mortality (live birth) and pregn
he  household asset wealth score is generated by applying principal component an
eﬁnition, it captures not only the availability of the programme
ut also demand side factors driving utilisation.
This paper addresses the limitations of past research on the
SY. Given the high proﬁle nature of the programme, we  set out
o provide more credible estimates of impact across a wide range
f behaviours. We  also provide new ﬁndings on how the JSY affects
ealth seeking choices between different types of provider, the
eterogeneity of impacts, and whether the JSY has unintended con-
equences.
. Measures and data
.1. Study outcomes
Data on the study outcomes come from the household com-
onent of the District Level Health Survey (DLHS), a repeated
ross-section survey designed to provide estimates on maternal
nd child health and service utilisation at the district level in India
International Institute for Population Sciences, 2010). We  use data
rom two rounds of the household survey. The DLHS-2, conducted
ver the period 2002–2004, interviewed 507,622 currently married
omen in 593 districts. The DLHS-3 was carried out in 2007–2008
nd interviewed 643,944 currently married women in 611 districts.
The married woman questionnaire is modelled closely on
ndia’s established National Family and Health Survey. It contains
easures of health care utilisation and health status that the JSY
ould be expected to improve. Our main utilisation outcome is
irths in a health facility, measured using information on the place
f delivery of the woman’s most recent birth. The analysis also con-
iders variants on this outcome, such as the type of health provider
hosen, whether a health worker was in attendance and the type
f procedure performed at delivery.
Our main measures of health status are one-day mortality (death
f a baby within 24 h after being born alive) and neonatal mortal-
ty (death of a baby within 28 days after being born alive). Both
re measured using information on the birth history of women8.
8 Unless truncated, a birth history documents every birth a woman has had during
er  lifetime. It typically includes the birth outcome, sex of the child, birth order,ations over the period 2001/2002–2007/2008. The unit of observation is a woman’s
is year (woman-year). Assisted delivery includes the use of forceps or a ventouse.
 to a set of household asset ownership variables.
The ﬁnancial year of the most recent delivery and each live birth is
established using information on the year and month reported by
women9. The DLHS-3 limits the recall period of birth histories to
1st January 2004, while those in DLHS-2 are not truncated. How-
ever, to ensure recall periods are approximately the same in the
two survey rounds, we drop all observations prior to 1st April 2001.
Thus, when we stack the data from the two survey rounds, we  have
observations in every ﬁnancial year from 2001/2002 to 2007/2008.
An important contribution of this paper is to consider the effect
of the JSY on a second set of outcomes that we  refer to as unin-
tended consequences of the programme. These are outcomes that
did not feature in the stated objectives of the programme and are in
this sense unintended. They include the likelihood of giving birth
in a private health facility, getting pregnant in a given year, and
breastfeeding immediately after childbirth. We establish whether
a woman  was  pregnant in a given year using the pregnancy his-
tories contained in the survey. To measure breastfeeding, women
were asked if and when they started breastfeeding the child of their
most recent delivery. We  focus on breastfeeding within the ﬁrst
hour, when information from health providers on the beneﬁts of
timely breastfeeding is most likely to take effect. All outcomes in
this study are comparable across the two survey rounds, both in
terms of how they are deﬁned and the interview questions used to
elicit the required information.
Summary statistics on the outcome measures before and after
the start of the JSY are shown in Panel A of Table 1. Neonatal mor-
tality fell over the course of the two  periods from 33 to 27 deaths
per 1000 live births. Facility births saw a modest increase over time
but still more than half of women  continued to give birth at home.
Around 8% of women gave birth by caesarean section and a furthermonth and year of childbirth, age of woman at childbirth and, if the child died, age
at  death.
9 We work in ﬁnancial years (1st April to 31st March) throughout because the
government’s annual budgetary cycle is likely to correspond more closely to the
introduction of the JSY than calendar years.
1 f Health Economics 43 (2015) 154–169
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Table 2
JSY coverage by year.
2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
Districts with
JSY coverage 0–10% 279 163 98
JSY  coverage 10–25% 151 137 144
JSY  coverage 25–50% 123 164 162
JSY  coverage >50% 34 123 18358 T. Powell-Jackson et al. / Journal o
ho reported being pregnant in any given year was  8%. In addition
o information on study outcomes, we exploited data on a broad
ange of socio-demographic characteristics as detailed in Panel B
f Table 1.
The data contain a district identiﬁer which we  use to esti-
ate speciﬁcations with district ﬁxed effects. However, because the
dministrative boundaries of some districts changed in the period
etween the two surveys, we map  new districts in the DLHS-3 onto
heir old counterparts in the DLHS-2 data. In most cases this was
ossible, leaving 587 districts that were consistently deﬁned across
he two datasets10. In estimating the effect of the JSY on care seek-
ng behaviour and health status, for lack of data we assumed that
he district in which women are residing at the time of interview
as the same as the one where she gave birth. Available evidence
uggests that residents of a district rarely travel to other districts
o seek healthcare11.
.2. JSY coverage
Our estimation strategy rests on there being variation in the
mplementation of the JSY. We  exploit such variation at the district
evel, the administrative unit directly below the Indian state which
as responsibility for planning and implementation of federal and
tate policies. If the ﬁnancial incentives of the JSY are to bite, house-
olds should be exposed to information about the programme and
nancial incentives should reach eligible women12. Data on the
atter provide the foundation for our measure of JSY penetration
nd is based on responses to the question: “Did you receive any
overnment ﬁnancial assistance for delivery care under the Janani
uraksha Yojana or state-speciﬁc scheme.” Speciﬁcally, we  use the
erm JSY coverage to refer to the number of women who gave birth
n a public facility and received the cash as a proportion of women
ho gave birth in a public facility13. Full coverage thus implies
very woman giving birth in a public health facility receives the
nancial incentive. Because coverage of the JSY is constructed from
he sample of women who delivered in a public facility, it is primar-
ly a supply-driven measure of the intensity of implementation. It
s affected not by the demand for care but rather the government’s
bility to make the programme available to women at the level of
ervice delivery, an assertion we test below.
Our measure of JSY implementation is based on beneﬁciary
ata from households rather than administrative data (e.g. bud-
et releases or district expenditure) for several important reasons.
irst, such administrative data may  reﬂect only the intention of
he government, whereas information on whether a district has
SY beneﬁciaries implies that the government has taken all the
10 In cases where the geographical boundaries of newly created districts cut across
wo or more old districts, we  were unable to map  the new districts onto their old
ounterparts.
11 In a recent survey of women  in Uttar Pradesh, we ﬁnd that only 1.8% of women
iving birth in a facility travelled outside of their district for delivery. Sood et al.
2014) ﬁnd little evidence of cross-district healthcare seeking in a study of health
nsurance in Karnataka.
12 A study carried out in 2008 in the high-focus states of Bihar, Orissa, Uttar
radesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan found that four-ﬁfths of women were aware
f  the scheme and almost half of women giving birth in a health facility received the
SY cash (UNFPA, 2009).
13 Due to imprecise wording, this question picked up responses that refer to the
ational Maternity Beneﬁt Scheme (MBS), an initiative that preceded the JSY up until
ts  ofﬁcial introduction in April 2005 (see Section 2 for more detail). This explains
hy  7.4% of women giving birth in a health facility report receiving a cash payment
n  2004/05, before the JSY was  even ofﬁcial government policy. We  code the JSY
overage variable as zero prior to the ofﬁcial start of the programme. While the JSY is
ot  limited to the public sector, our measure of coverage considers only public sector
ecipients of the ﬁnancial incentive because only a few nonstate health providers –
n  contrast to all health providers in the public sector – were accredited and able to
articipate in the JSY.Total sample 587 587 587
Notes: Based on data from the DLHS-3.
necessary steps to start the programme on the ground. Second,
there is no reason to believe administrative data would be any more
reliable than household data. In fact, such information is easy to
manipulate systematically and incentives are likely to be there to
do so.
Table 2 shows the expansion of the JSY programme over time. In
its ﬁrst year, JSY coverage was less than 10% in 279 of the 587 dis-
tricts, while only a handful of districts had coverage over 50%. Over
time coverage of the JSY at the district level increased. In the third
year of the programme, JSY coverage was more than 10% in 489 of
the 587 districts. Fig. 1 illustrates well the considerable variation in
the expansion of the programme between districts and over time. It
also provides descriptive evidence of the relationship between the
JSY programme and facility births. Districts where the JSY was  pro-
gressively better implemented appear to have the largest increases
in the proportion of women  giving birth in government health facil-
ities.
In anticipation of the empirical analysis, we  recognise that vari-
ation in the coverage of the JSY across districts is unlikely to
be random. Discussions with policymakers and other stakehol-
ders engaged with the JSY suggest that the introduction of the
programme was prioritised in socioeconomically disadvantaged
places. At the national level, the JSY was  explicitly prioritised
according to high-focus and low-focus states. More importantly,
however, interviews indicated that the JSY was  prioritised within
states at the district level. For example, in the state of West Bengal,
health sector reforms including the JSY gave particular attention
to six focal districts, identiﬁed on the basis of health indicators,
poverty and socially marginalised population groups14.
Empirically we  can examine the relationship between JSY
coverage and several socioeconomic variables highlighted by pol-
icymakers. In Table A1 of the Appendix, we  run a district-level
regression of JSY coverage on poverty incidence, the tribal popu-
lation share and average household wealth showing that the three
variables of interest are strong predictors of JSY coverage. Broadly
this remains true when we include state ﬁxed effects. The data sup-
port the qualitative evidence in showing the role of these district
characteristics in inﬂuencing the decision on where to introduce
the JSY. In the ﬁnal column we  see that the share of births in a
government facility in the year before the JSY does not predict sub-
sequent implementation of the programme, suggesting that our
measure of JSY is not picking up demand side factors inﬂuencing
utilisation of health services.
4. Empirical strategy
Our identiﬁcation strategy uses a difference-in-difference
approach to estimate the impact of the JSY on our study outcomes.
We compare changes over time in health care utilisation and health
status with changes in the intensity of the JSY programme. More
14 Scheduled tribes are historically disadvantaged people in India, given explicit
recognition in India’s Constitution.
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Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of the JSY on various
measures of health care utilisation. Panel A present results from
15 Our measure of poverty is constructed using information relating to the govern-
ment system of identifying poor households. Speciﬁcally, it is based on responsesig. 1. JSY coverage and proportion of women giving birth in a government facility
his map  is for illustrative purposes and does not imply the expression of any opi
erritory or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
recisely, in our basic speciﬁcation we run a regression of each
utcome on JSY coverage while controlling for year and district
xed effects. The ﬁxed effects absorb variation due to common
emporal shocks and time-invariant district factors.
To increase the strength of causal inference, we  also control
or a wide range of potential confounding factors. Formally, let
idt denote our outcome, a binary measure of service utilisation
r health status for observation i in district d in year t. Let JSYdt
enote our measure of programme coverage in district d in year t.
ur speciﬁcation takes the form:
idt = ˇ0 + ˇ1JSYdt + ϑtZdˇ2 + Xidtˇ3 + ωd + t + εidt, (1)
here ωd and t are district and year ﬁxed effects, respectively;
idt is a vector of individual demographic characteristics including
ducation of the mother, education of the husband, maternal age,
ousehold wealth, the recall period (months between interview
nd birth of child) and dummies for (categories) of urban residence,
eligion, ethnicity, parity, multiple births and survey round; and Zd
s a vector of district-level characteristics. To model the effect of the
rogramme ﬂexibly, JSYdt enters the regressions as dummy  vari-
bles that correspond to the following levels of coverage: 10–25%,
5–50% and >50%. We  cluster our standard errors at the district
evel.
To address several sources of potential confounding, we include
nteractions between the year of birth and the share of the dis-
rict population below the poverty line, the tribal population share,
nd the district mean of the household wealth asset score, repre-
ented by the term ϑtZd. Data used to generate these district-leveln the part of the authors or Journal, concerning the legal status of any country or
variables come from the DLHS-315, which means we are control-
ling for differential trends based on 2008 values rather than actual
trends.
As is clear from Eq. (1), we run regressions of each outcome using
individual level data to make the most of the rich micro dataset at
our disposal. This allows us to include controls for a range of indi-
vidual demographic characteristics that might affect health care
utilisation and health status. In using individual level data, we note
that the unit of observation differs according to the outcome. Each
observation is a delivery (the most recent only) in the utilisation
equations, and a live birth in the mortality equations. In the anal-
ysis of pregnancies, the unit of observation is woman-year but we
must rely on data from the DLHS-3 only (2004–2008) because the
DLHS-2 did not collect information on pregnancy histories.
5. Main results
5.1. Use of health care and mortalityto  the question: “Does this household have a below the poverty line (BPL) card?”
Because we  are interested in controlling for sources of endogeneity that arise from
government decision making processes, this poverty measure – rather than one
measured perhaps more reliably in terms of household consumption – is particularly
appropriate for our purposes.
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Table  3
Association of JSY with use of maternal health care services.
Dependent variable Health worker
in attendance
at delivery
Delivery in
a  health
facility
Delivery in
public health
facility
Delivery by type of public health facility At least
three ANC
visits
Hospital Community health
centre
Primary health
centre
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage
10–25%
−0.0053
(0.0055)
−0.0061
(0.0054)
−0.00072
(0.0049)
0.00081
(0.0044)
0.0010
(0.0017)
0.0023
(0.0019)
0.00071
(0.0053)
JSY  coverage
25–50%
0.0017
(0.0061)
0.0072
(0.0061)
0.019***
(0.0055)
0.0033
(0.0047)
0.0092***
(0.0023)
0.011***
(0.0027)
0.0052
(0.0061)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.056***
(0.0090)
0.075***
(0.0093)
0.11***
(0.0086)
0.028***
(0.0061)
0.040***
(0.0045)
0.051***
(0.0039)
0.010
(0.0075)
Panel  B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage
10–25%
−0.0021
(0.0048)
−0.0033
(0.0047)
−0.0015
(0.0047)
−0.00011
(0.0040)
0.0016
(0.0017)
0.0018
(0.0020)
0.00099
(0.0048)
JSY  coverage
25–50%
0.0028
(0.0053)
0.0075
(0.0053)
0.013**
(0.0055)
0.00017
(0.0044)
0.010***
(0.0024)
0.0078***
(0.0026)
0.0035
(0.0057)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.063***
(0.0081)
0.082***
(0.0084)
0.10***
(0.0084)
0.027***
(0.0057)
0.043***
(0.0046)
0.045***
(0.0037)
0.010
(0.0073)
Mean  of dep.
variable at baseline
0.46 0.39 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.45
Number of
observations
342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 340,323
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with
a  doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline model includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes
interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls
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irths, a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (mos
** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
ur basic speciﬁcation which includes district and year ﬁxed effects.
n Panel B, we additionally control for district characteristics and
ndividual demographics.
Column (1) shows that the JSY was associated with an increase
n the percentage of women giving birth with a health worker in
ttendance at delivery. Speciﬁcally, the likelihood of giving birth
ith a health worker was 5.6 percentage points higher in districts
ith JSY coverage >50% than districts with coverage <10%. At lower
evels of JSY coverage, there was no signiﬁcant association. Columns
2) and (3) show the effect of the JSY on health facility births with
he same pattern of results. The point estimates indicate that the
rogramme at levels of coverage >50% was associated with a 7.5
ercentage point increase in facility births and an 11 percentage
oint increase in public facility births. Columns (4) to (6) present
he effect of the JSY on utilisation by each type of public health
acility. These results imply that the impact on public health facility
irths was driven largely by increases in births at community health
entres and primary health centres. By contrast, district hospitals
ccounted for only a small proportion of the treatment effect. These
ndings suggest an expansion in uptake of delivery care services at
ublic health providers below the district hospital.
Column (7) shows that the JSY did not have an effect on utili-
ation of antenatal care services. The point estimates for three or
ore antenatal care visits are small and statistically insigniﬁcant
nd the result holds irrespective of how we deﬁne the antena-
al care outcome (result not shown)16. This ﬁnding is reassuring
or our empirical strategy because we anticipate no large effect
iven that the ﬁnancial incentive in the JSY was not explicitly tied
o the use of antenatal care. It suggests that the JSY treatment
16 Alternative measures of antenatal care utilisation include the number of ante-
atal care visits. Using a Poisson regression we ﬁnd no effect on the number of
ntenatal care visits.call period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live
nt only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data.
indicator is not simply acting as a proxy for other government
policies aimed at strengthening maternal health services. Further
results showing the effect of the JSY on the rate of caesarean
sections and assisted deliveries are reported in Table A2 of the
Appendix. The JSY at coverage levels >50% was associated with a
decrease in the caesarean section rate and an increase in assisted
deliveries. The negative impact on the caesarean section rate is
most likely explained by the shift away from the private sector
(reported in Section 5.3) where the vast majority of caesarean sec-
tions are conducted17.
When we include extensive controls for potential confounders
the point estimates remain essentially the same (Panel B of Table 3).
For example, the likelihood of giving birth in a government health
facility is 10 percentage points higher in districts with JSY cover-
age >50% than districts with coverage <10%. When we  include in the
model a single treatment variable indicating JSY coverage >10%, the
ﬁndings are qualitatively similar (Table A3 of the Appendix). This
model is more akin to an intention-to-treat analysis in the sense
that the estimates reﬂect better the impact of the JSY irrespective of
how well districts implemented the programme. When we  include
in the model JSY coverage as a continuous variable the ﬁndings
remain qualitatively largely unchanged (Table A4 of the Appendix).
For example, a 1 percentage point increase in JSY coverage is asso-
ciated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in government facility
births.
We next turn to the mortality results (Table 4). The results in
column (1) show that there is no strong evidence the JSY reduced
neonatal mortality. None of the coefﬁcients on the JSY coverage
dummies are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. At coverage levels >50%
17 By contrast, at the ﬁrst level of referral in the public sector only 18% of commu-
nity health centres offer caesarean sections and less than 10% have blood storage
facilities (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2010).
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Table  4
Association of JSY with neonatal mortality.
Dependent variable: Neonatal mortality Disaggregated measures of mortality
1 day mortality Death between 2 and 28 days Death between 8 and 28 days
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.00078
(0.0012)
−0.0013
(0.00085)
0.00051
(0.00085)
0.00026
(0.00049)
JSY coverage 25–50% −0.00030
(0.0013)
−0.00048
(0.00093)
0.00018
(0.00092)
0.000067
(0.00051)
JSY coverage >50% −0.0031*
(0.0016)
−0.0020*
(0.0012)
−0.0011
(0.0011)
−0.00057
(0.00065)
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.00043
(0.0012)
−0.0012
(0.00086)
0.00075
(0.00084)
0.00036
(0.00049)
JSY coverage 25–50% 0.00026
(0.0012)
−0.00051
(0.00095)
0.00077
(0.00089)
0.00030
(0.00053)
JSY coverage >50% −0.0027
(0.0017)
−0.0022*
(0.0012)
−0.00053
(0.0011)
−0.00029
(0.00066)
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.031 0.015 0.016 0.0060
Number of observations 429,443 429,443 429,443 429,443
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
(Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Baseline model includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with
district  and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth
a n, mo
u he un
*
t
d
t
w
d
m
J
t
i
T
>
r
4
e
c
w
m
m
t
e
o
t
n
o
e
J
e
h
o
2
J
t
c
5
7
live births21. Clearly our conclusions are much less encouraging
with regards to the healthcare utilisation ﬁndings. The estimates of
impact on neonatal mortality are of the same order magnitude in
18 This estimate is calculated by applying the coefﬁcients in column 2 of Table 3 to
the  respective number of live births in each set of districts categorised according to
the  various levels of JSY coverage in 2007/08.
19 This ﬁgure is likely to represent a minimum cost since we have not factored
in  administration of the JSY, whose economic cost is not captured by programme
expenditures. If we assume conservatively that administration costs represent 10%
of  programme spending, expenditure per additional facility birth was $321.
20 Bonu et al. (2009) report estimates of household expenditure on delivery care
from India’s National Sample Survey in 2004. We use household expenditure on a
private facility birth on the basis that this better reﬂects the full economic cost of
giving birth. Because the public sector is subsidised, expenditure on a public facilitysset  score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s educatio
rban  dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth and survey round. T
** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
he JSY is associated with a reduction in neonatal mortality of 3.1
eaths per 1000 live births which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In
he speciﬁcation with the full set of controls, we  are able to reject
ith 95% conﬁdence a negative effect of the JSY larger than 5.9
eaths per 1000. In columns (2) to (4) we separate out neonatal
ortality into its constituent parts since we anticipate that if the
SY were to reduce mortality, the effect would be strongest within
he ﬁrst 24 h of childbirth when maternity care is provided. Results
n column (2) show a negative effect of the JSY on one-day mortality.
here is a slight suggestion of an effect of the JSY at coverage levels
50%. In the speciﬁcation with the full set of controls, we  are able to
eject with 95% conﬁdence a negative effect of the JSY larger than
.5 deaths per 1000. Columns (3) and (4) conﬁrm that there was no
ffect of the JSY on later neonatal mortality, which provides some
onﬁdence that the ﬁndings in column (2) are not spurious for we
ould not anticipate maternity care to have a direct effect on the
ortality of the baby after the mother is discharged to go home. The
ortality ﬁndings remain similar when we include additional con-
rols (Panel B of Table 3), or replace the JSY coverage dummies with
ither a single binary treatment variable of >10% coverage (Table A3
f the Appendix) or a continuous treatment variable (Table A4 of
he Appendix).
These ﬁndings suggest that the JSY did not have a large effect on
eonatal and one-day mortality but the conﬁdence intervals leave
pen the possibility that the JSY had a modest effect at high lev-
ls of programme coverage. Why  was the association between the
SY and mortality, at best, only modest? One possibility is that the
ffect on utilisation was not sufﬁciently large to translate into better
ealth outcomes. A second explanation points to the poor quality
f care in the public sector (Chaturvedi et al., 2014; Hulton et al.,
007; Nagpal et al., 2015; Stanton et al., 2014), and the fact that the
SY increased uptake of maternity services at health facilities below
he district hospital, which are not equipped to manage emergency
omplications at childbirth..2. Magnitudes and simple cost-effectiveness
According to our estimates, the JSY encouraged an additional
10 thousand women in India to give birth in a health facility inther’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of
it of observation is a live birth (based on the birth history of a woman).
2007/200818. In a rough calculation using programme expenditure
data, we estimate that the government spent $292 of JSY money
for each additional facility birth19. Because the ﬁnancial incentive is
given irrespective of whether the individual would have given birth
in the health facility in the absence of the JSY, the cost per marginal
visit is much higher than the value of incentive. Using data on the
cost of delivery from Bonu et al. (2009), we calculate a total cost
of $415 for each additional facility birth20. However, while a cost
to the government, one could argue that the ﬁnancial incentives
should not be considered a cost at all since they represent a transfer
of resources. The cost to society then is only the deadweight loss
associated with taxation, the administrative cost of running the JSY
and the cost of providing delivery care services.
There is a growing literature on demand-side incentives in
health against which to compare the magnitudes of our estimated
effects. In terms of the JSY, we compare our results against the
study by Lim et al. (2010) which suggests that the programme
increased use of antenatal care (three visits or more) by 11 per-
centage points, increased facility births by 44 to 49 percentage
points, and reduced neonatal mortality by 2 to 6 deaths per 1000birth is likely to be a gross underestimate. While crude, our cost estimate gives
a  sense of the order of magnitude. Note that the ﬁnancial data are adjusted for
inﬂation.
21 See the Online Appendix for a more detailed comparison of the two set of ﬁnd-
ings.
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Table  5
Association of JSY with unintended outcomes.
Dependent variable Place of delivery Pregnant (2004–2008) Breastfeeding
Private health facility Public health facility Within 1 h Within 24 h
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0053
(0.0041)
−0.00072
(0.0049)
0.00058
(0.0011)
0.016**
(0.0071)
0.015*
(0.0082)
JSY  coverage 25–50% −0.012***
(0.0042)
0.019***
(0.0055)
0.0011
(0.0012)
0.026***
(0.0085)
0.025***
(0.0096)
JSY  coverage >50% −0.034***
(0.0047)
0.11***
(0.0086)
0.0070***
(0.0019)
0.075***
(0.011)
0.076***
(0.013)
Panel  B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0018
(0.0039)
−0.0015
(0.0047)
0.0016
(0.0010)
0.017**
(0.0072)
0.015*
(0.0081)
JSY  coverage 25–50% −0.0053
(0.0040)
0.013**
(0.0055)
0.0026**
(0.0012)
0.026***
(0.0087)
0.023**
(0.0097)
JSY  coverage >50% −0.022***
(0.0045)
0.10***
(0.0084)
0.0094***
(0.0020)
0.073***
(0.012)
0.069***
(0.014)
Mean  of dep. variable at baseline 0.19 0.20 0.086 0.32 0.54
Number of observations 342,875 342,875 2,528,498 336,252 336,252
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3, except column (3) which uses pregnancy data from women in the DLHS-3 only.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Column
(3)  assumes that the number of months a woman has been pregnant, if pregnant at the time of interview, is as good as random (constrained to be between three and nine
months). Baseline model includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district
share  of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education,
mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round. The
u is a w
*
t
e
c
e
t
G
(
d
(
e
v
m
h
5
t
t
t
h
s
t
t
s
c
i
c
s
a
t
b
w
of conditional cash transfers (Morris et al., 2004a; Stecklov et al.,
2006) and cable TV (Jensen and Oster, 2009) and estimates reported
in these studies are greater than the effect of the JSY found here.
blade was  used to cut the umbilical cord. The DLHS, however, provides no scope
for  measuring these outcomes consistently between the two survey rounds. Childnit  of observation is a delivery (most recent only), except in columns (3) where it 
** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
he two studies. The key difference is the mortality effects in Lim
t al. (2010) are statistically signiﬁcant in two of the three identiﬁ-
ation strategies they use. Beyond the JSY, there is a strong body of
xperimental evidence that comes from studies of conditional cash
ransfers in Malawi (Baird et al., 2012), Mexico (Fernald et al., 2008;
ertler, 2000, 2004), Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 2005), Brazil
Morris et al., 2004b), Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2008), Hon-
uras (Morris et al., 2004a), one-off ﬁnancial incentives in Malawi
Thornton, 2008), and non-ﬁnancial incentives in India (Banerjee
t al., 2010), although few are speciﬁc to maternal health. The inter-
entions in these studies were targeted towards poor families and
ost provide some evidence of positive effects on utilisation of
ealth services and immunisation coverage.
.3. Unintended consequences
Our results thus far have focused on outcomes which, according
o the stated objectives of the programme, the JSY was intended
o improve. However, high powered incentives have the poten-
ial to inﬂuence a broad range of behaviours, which in turn may
ave both positive and negative implications for welfare. Here we
tudy three possible effects of such incentives. First, we expect
he JSY to increase demand for public maternity services, in part,
hrough a substitution away from private health providers. Second,
ome have argued that cash payments for delivery or child health
are provide an incentive to become pregnant. Third, ﬁnancial
ncentives for delivery care may  have positive beneﬁts through
hanges in health-related behaviours subsequent to childbirth,
uch as breastfeeding. The idea is that women who  give birth in
 health facility are more likely to be exposed to information on
he beneﬁts of timely breastfeeding22.
22 We also considered other health-related behaviours potentially inﬂuenced
y  exposure to information during childbirth, including postnatal care seeking,
hether the baby was  immediately wiped dry and wrapped, and whether a sterilizedoman-year.
Table 5 presents the results on unintended consequences of the
JSY. Column (1) shows that the JSY was associated with a reduc-
tion in utilisation of maternity services in the private sector. For
reference, we  reproduce in column (2) the previous ﬁndings on
utilisation of services in the public sector. Substitution away from
the private sector accounts for a sizeable proportion of the effect of
the JSY on public facility births. Data from the DLHS lend support
to these ﬁndings by showing that the JSY has been predominantly
a public sector programme despite the stated policy to involve pri-
vate health providers. Only 10% of JSY beneﬁciaries nationwide gave
birth in a private health facility.
We next look at the results on pregnancies23. They show in col-
umn  (4) that the JSY was associated with a modest increase in the
likelihood of a woman being pregnant in a given year. This result
is plausible when we consider that it probably reﬂects a reduction
in birth spacing rather than an increase in the total lifetime num-
ber of children. Either way, there are implications for health given
that both birth spacing and total fertility are important underlying
causes of maternal and neonatal mortality (Zhu et al., 1999). Other
studies have shown that fertility is amenable to change in the faceimmunization was not regarded as a plausible indirect outcome given the long time
lag between childbirth and vaccinations.
23 For women who  report being pregnant at the time of interview, we have no
information on when they became pregnant to assign the pregnancy to a speciﬁc
year. We therefore use a random number generator, constrained between three and
nine, to determine the number of months a woman is pregnant, if pregnant at the
time of interview. The pregnancy for these women  is thus assigned to one of two
possible years. Another approach might seek to model seasonality in pregnancy. The
data, however, show that the probability of pregnancy differs little across months
of  the year.
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Table  6
Heterogeneity in the effect of the JSY on government facility births.
Education of mother Wealth of household Residence (in high
focus states)
Focal states
No education Some education Poorest half Richest half Urban Rural High focus Low focus
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage 0.22***
(0.016)
0.18***
(0.014)
0.22***
(0.017)
0.18***
(0.015)
0.19***
(0.027)
0.24***
(0.017)
0.22***
(0.017)
0.0083
(0.020)
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage 0.22***
(0.016)
0.18***
(0.014)
0.23***
(0.016)
0.18***
(0.015)
0.18***
(0.027)
0.24***
(0.017)
0.23***
(0.016)
−0.012
(0.021)
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.11 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.28
Number of observations 161,813 181,062 174,488 168,387 42,155 191,197 233,352 109,523
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Baseline
model  includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the
population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age
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The risk of increased childbearing was partly anticipated by pol-
cymakers in the design of the JSY and these safeguards provide
ome motivation to scrutinise the validity of the pregnancy results.
f women with more than two children were unable to receive the
SY cash, why would they be incentivised to become pregnant? The
olicy of limiting the cash payment to women with two or fewer
hildren applied only to the low focus states and was difﬁcult to
mplement. DLHS-3 data show that the probability of a woman
eceiving the cash incentive after giving birth in a public health
acility is statistically the same across parity groups, a pattern which
uggests policy attempts to mitigate this unintended consequence
ere not implemented24.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 report the results on breastfeeding
ithin the ﬁrst hour and the ﬁrst 24 h of birth, respectively. Both
ets of results suggest that the JSY was associated with an increase
n breastfeeding soon after childbirth.
.4. Robustness
Our estimates of effect are credible in so far as our identifying
ssumption holds that JSY coverage is orthogonal to the error term.
hile it is by deﬁnition impossible to test this assumption formally,
e can mitigate concerns of bias due to non-random place-
ent of the JSY by pursuing several robustness checks. Pre-trends
re a commonly used tool to examine whether the assumption
nderpinning the difference-in-difference approach is credible.
peciﬁcally, if districts with different levels of coverage of the JSY
ave similar trends in outcomes prior to the start of the programme,
e can be more conﬁdent of our estimates. Descriptive data are
eassuring in this respect. Pre-trends plotted separately for districts
n each of the four categories of JSY coverage are similar (see Online
ppendix). More formally, using only data prior to the start of the
SY programme, we examine whether pre-trends differ according
o future JSY coverage. As indicated by the coefﬁcient on the inter-
ction between years since the start of the data period and future
24 The percentage of women  who received the cash incentive conditional on giving
irth in a public health facility is as follows: ﬁrst birth (33.0%); second birth (32.5%),
hird birth (29.1%); fourth birth (33.4%); and ﬁfth or higher birth (35.5%). While
hese data are not perfect – the number of times a woman has given birth does not
ecessarily equal the number of living children – they are highly suggestive of the
olicy not being effective in practice.eligion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round. The demographic
(most recent only).
JSY coverage in Table A5 of the Appendix, we are unable to reject
the null hypothesis of equal pre-trends25.
We then examine whether JSY coverage is correlated with the
characteristics of individual women. We  have argued that JSY
coverage is primarily a supply-side measure. This check provides
evidence on whether JSY coverage is correlated with demand once
we control for selection at the district level. We regress the JSY
coverage variable on the full set of individual-level demographic
controls while including the district covariates. Table A6 of the
Appendix presents the results of this robustness check. The results
in column (1) are simply to show that when we  fail to account for
selection at the district level, individual demographics are a strong
predictor of JSY implementation. An F test of the joint hypothesis
that none of the demographics is correlated with JSY coverage is
rejected (p = 0.015). When we do control for selection at the district
level, in column (2), we see that these same demand-side factors
are no longer correlated with implementation of the JSY (p = 0.290)
despite the fact that, as column (3) shows, they are strong predic-
tors of utilisation of government delivery care services (p = <0.001).
Together these results give us more conﬁdence that the variation
in our measure of JSY coverage is largely supply-driven.
We performed a range of further robustness checks. These are
summarised in Table A7 of the Appendix. Long difference regres-
sions using data at three-year intervals yield coefﬁcients similar to
the main results (Panel A). Dropping districts with a high neonatal
mortality rate of over 50 deaths per 1000 live births (6% of districts)
leads to almost identical coefﬁcients (Panel B). Excluding districts in
states where there was no parity condition connected to the receipt
of the cash (i.e. states designated by the programme as low priority)
leaves the point estimates essentially the same (Panel C). Finally,
allowing for the possibility of confounding trends, by including
state-speciﬁc time trends, reduces the magnitude of the estimates
although the general pattern of results remains unchanged (Panel
D).
6. Heterogeneity in impactsWe ﬁrst examine how the effect of the JSY is distributed
along several standard dimensions of socioeconomic status, namely
25 These ﬁndings hold if we interact time with categories of JSY coverage (result
not shown).
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aternal education and household wealth. These can be consid-
red demand-side factors that may  modify the effect of the JSY
n health care seeking behaviour. We  then study whether there
s a dose–response relationship. By exploiting the fact that the JSY
ubstantially varies the amount of cash paid to women in differ-
nt places, we are able to learn more about a fundamental policy
arameter. The amount of cash paid to women is more generous
n rural areas than urban areas within high focus states, and in
igh focus states than low focus states. We  therefore conduct two
ubgroup analyses along these lines.
Table 6 presents the JSY treatment effects across various sub-
amples with public facility births as the dependent variable. The
rst two columns show that the effect of the JSY on utilisation
s greater amongst women with no education than women with
ome education (p value of the difference is <0.001). The next two
olumns compare the treatment effect between the two wealth
roups, with point estimates showing a similar pattern to the edu-
ation results. Poorer women are more likely to give birth in a
ublic health facility in response to the JSY than richer women (p
alue of the difference is <0.001). The results in the remaining four
olumns show that the effect of the JSY was larger in places where
he amount of cash offered to women was greater. The response
o the JSY was greater in rural areas than urban areas (p value of
he difference is 0.058) and greater in low focus than high focus
tates (p value of the difference is <0.001). When considered rela-
ive to the baseline mean, the differences between the subgroups
re clearly large.
. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the association between one
f the world’s largest demand-side ﬁnancial incentive programmes
nd health-related outcomes in India. Consistent with much of the
iterature outside of India, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial incentives in
he JSY are associated with an increase in the use of formal health
ervices, particularly at lower levels of the public health system.
he increase in use of formal maternal health care due to the pro-
ramme  was modest. Our ﬁndings on neonatal mortality show no
trong evidence of an effect, although conﬁdence intervals are not
ufﬁciently tight to reject modest effects of the JSY on mortality.
A persuasive explanation for the mortality ﬁnding is that the JSY
ncentivised women predominantly to health facilities whose pur-
ose was not to manage life-threatening complications. However
ood the quality of care in health institutions below the district
ospital, it may  remain inadequate to save the lives of women andth Economics 43 (2015) 154–169
their baby, particularly when obstetric emergencies require inten-
sive rather than obstetric care (Costello et al., 2006). Having a fully
functional referral system is thus critical for the success of any inter-
vention which seeks to increase uptake of institutional delivery care
(Campbell and Graham, 2006). Existing evidence suggests that the
quality of maternity services and the referral system in the public
sector remains poor in India (Chaturvedi et al., 2014; Hulton et al.,
2007; Nagpal et al., 2015; Stanton et al., 2014).
We have argued that high powered incentives have the poten-
tial to inﬂuence a broad range of behaviours, intended or otherwise.
Any evaluation of ﬁnancial incentives should go beyond the narrow
objectives of the programme to examine potential unintended con-
sequences. Our pregnancy results are striking because they suggest
a pathway through which the programme’s own objective of reduc-
ing maternal and neonatal mortality may  be undermined. It also
serves to demonstrate the importance of anticipating such risks in
the programme design and, in turn, ensuring appropriate measures
are put into practice.
A further point of discussion relates to the generalisability of
our ﬁndings to an expanded JSY programme, say ﬁve years down
the line. It is certainly possible that the effect of the programme
has increased as it has matured. Women  will only be incentivised
by the programme if they know about the beneﬁts but it takes
time for such information to spread in the population. Alterna-
tively, the effects in this paper may  be larger than those observed
when the JSY ﬁnally reaches all districts in India. Early implemen-
tation of the JSY was understandably prioritised in districts that
contain poorer populations and evidence on impact heterogeneity
suggests that these districts were the ones where the greatest ben-
eﬁts from the programme could be realised. Thus, extending our
estimates of effect to the period since 2008 may not provide a good
approximation to the true impact of the programme.
The collective evidence in this paper, on both intended and unin-
tended effects, points towards the need for policymakers to be
cautious in the use of ﬁnancial incentives. For example, even though
it is self-evident that the supply-side must be in place if demand-
side ﬁnancial incentives are to work, there is a proliferation of
schemes in countries where the quality and even availability of care
are vastly inadequate. Future research on this topic should broaden
its scope to address questions around their long-term effects, and
the potential harms they may  cause (Lagarde et al., 2007).Appendix A. Appendix
Tables A1–A7
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Table  A1
District correlates of JSY coverage.
Wealth Poverty Tribal population State ﬁxed effects Government facility births at baseline
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Average asset wealth score −0.058***
(0.0051)
−0.051***
(0.0053)
−0.041***
(0.0057)
−0.017**
(0.0088)
−0.018*
(0.0092)
Poor  share of population 0.13***
(0.032)
0.12**
(0.032)
0.13**
(0.055)
0.13**
(0.056)
Tribal share of population 0.14***
(0.030)
−0.0053
(0.037)
−0.0053
(0.037)
Government facility share of births 0.0059
(0.044)
State  ﬁxed effects No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-3.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is JSY coverage. The unit of observation is a district-year over the period 2005/2006 to 2007/2008.
Government facility share of births is measured at baseline (2004/2005).
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Table A2
Association of JSY with medical procedures at childbirth.
Dependent variable: Caesarean section Assisted delivery
(1) (2)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0038
(0.0026)
0.0012
(0.0020)
JSY coverage 25–50% −0.0032
(0.0028)
0.0019
(0.0022)
JSY coverage >50% −0.013***
(0.0032)
0.0076***
(0.0027)
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0021
(0.0024)
0.0014
(0.0020)
JSY coverage 25–50% 0.00081
(0.0027)
0.0016
(0.0023)
JSY coverage >50% −0.0054*
(0.0031)
0.0066**
(0.0028)
Mean of dependent variable at baseline 0.075 0.024
Number of observations 342,853 342,853
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Assisted
delivery  involves the use of forceps or a ventouse. Baseline model includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes
interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls
for  mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live
births,  a multiple birth, and survey round.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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Table A3
JSY as a binary treatment.
Dependent
variable:
Delivery in a
health facility
Delivery in
public facility
Delivery in
private facility
ANC three
visits
Neonatal
mortality
One-day
mortality
Pregnant
(2004–2008)
Breastfeeding
within 1 h
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY
coverage > 10%
0.013**
(0.0054)
0.025***
(0.0048)
−0.012***
(0.0037)
0.0040
(0.0052)
−0.00098
(0.0011)
−0.0011
(0.00079)
0.0014
(0.0010)
0.030***
(0.0074)
Panel  B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY
coverage > 10%
0.013***
(0.0046)
0.019***
(0.0047)
−0.0059*
(0.0035)
0.0032
(0.0048)
−0.00050
(0.0011)
−0.0011
(0.00080)
0.0025**
(0.00099)
0.028***
(0.0074)
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline
model  includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share,
and  wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live
births,  a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Table A4
JSY as a continuous treatment.
Dependent
variable:
Delivery in a
health facility
Delivery in
public facility
Delivery in
private facility
ANC three
visits
Neonatal
mortality
One-day
mortality
Pregnant
(2004−2008)
Breastfeeding
within 1 h
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Baseline model
JSY coverage 0.15***
(0.015)
0.20***
(0.014)
−0.059***
(0.0072)
0.020*
(0.012)
−0.0035
(0.0024)
−0.0022
(0.0018)
0.013***
(0.0030)
0.12***
(0.016)
Panel  B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
JSY coverage 0.16***
(0.014)
0.20***
(0.013)
−0.041***
(0.0067)
0.023**
(0.012)
−0.0033
(0.0025)
−0.0026
(0.0019)
0.017***
(0.061)
0.12***
(0.017)
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline
model  includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share,
and  wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live
births,  a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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Table  A5
Differences in pre-trends.
Delivery in a facility Delivery in public facility Neonatal mortality One-day mortality
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Baseline model
Time 0.011***
(0.0024)
0.0042*
(0.0021)
−0.0046***
(0.00060)
−0.0027***
(0.00039)
Time  × JSY coverage −0.011*
(0.0064)
0.0057
(0.0058)
0.00027
(0.0017)
0.0013
(0.0010)
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls
Time −0.00019
(0.0056)
−0.0086
(0.0064)
0.0045***
(0.0017)
0.0014
(0.0012)
Time × JSY coverage −0.00071
(0.0057)
0.0090
(0.0058)
0.0020
(0.0017)
0.0020*
(0.0011)
Mean  of dependent variable 0.39 0.20 0.033 0.016
Number of observations 168,887 168,887 226,567 226,567
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3 but are for the period before the start of the JSY only.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses.
Baseline model includes time (birth year since start of data period), an interaction between time and coverage of the JSY, and ﬁxed effects for district. Model with district
and  individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset
score  as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban
dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
Table A6
Correlation between JSY coverage and demographics.
JSY coverage JSY coverage Delivery in a health facility
(1)  (2) (3)
Urban −0.00050
(0.00097)
−0.00067
(0.00090)
0.049***
(−0.0052)
Hindu −0.00069
(0.00091)
−0.00047
(0.00085)
0.030***
(−0.005)
Scheduled caste −0.00025
(0.0010)
0.000036
(0.00098)
0.026***
(−0.0049)
Scheduled tribe 0.00054
(0.0013)
0.00034
(0.0012)
−0.049***
(−0.0073)
“Other backward” ethnicity 0.00028
(0.00082)
0.00045
(0.00076)
0.0034
(−0.0045)
Woman’s education (grades completed) −0.00016*
(0.000093)
−0.00014
(0.000086)
0.0040***
(−0.00043)
Husband’s education (grades completed) 0.000028
(0.000084)
0.000077
(0.000079)
0.0018***
(−0.00032)
Two  live births 0.0030***
(0.00089)
0.0014*
(0.00082)
−0.048***
(−0.0036)
Three  live births 0.0033***
(0.0011)
0.0025**
(0.0011)
−0.068***
(−0.0046)
Four  live births 0.0011
(0.0013)
0.00080
(0.0012)
−0.091***
(−0.0052)
Five  or more live births 0.00063
(0.0014)
0.0014
(0.0013)
−0.100***
(−0.0061)
Mother’s age at childbirth (years) −0.000094
(0.000085)
−0.00011
(0.000079)
0.00018
(−0.00032)
Wealth asset score 0.00026
(0.00022)
0.0000095
(0.00020)
−0.0027**
(−0.0012)
Multiple birth 0.0027
(0.0028)
0.0024
(0.0026)
0.069***
(−0.011)
District controls No Yes Yes
F  (14, 586) 2.01 1.18 57.72
p-value 0.015 0.290 <0.001
Number of observations 173,988 173,988 173,988
Number of districts 587 587 587
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth, as well as the variables
reported. Regression in column (2) and (3) further include interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population
share,  and mean wealth asset score.
*** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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Table  A7
Further robustness checks.
Delivery in public
facility
Delivery in private
facility
(1)  (2) 
Panel A. Three-year long differences (2001, 2004, 2007)
JSY  coverage 10–25% −0.0014
(0.012)
0.0028
(0.010)
JSY  coverage 25–50% 0.026**
(0.012)
0.00085
(0.0100)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.17***
(0.014)
−0.024**
(0.0096)
Panel B. Exclude high mortality districts
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.00071
(0.0050)
−0.0032
(0.0042)
JSY  coverage 25–50% 0.015**
(0.0057)
−0.0059
(0.0042)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.10***
(0.0086)
−0.023***
(0.0047)
Panel C. Exclude low priority states
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0016
(0.0064)
−0.00027
(0.0046)
JSY  coverage 25–50% 0.017**
(0.0075)
−0.0039
(0.0048)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.11***
(0.010)
−0.021***
(0.0056)
Panel D. State-speciﬁc time trends
JSY coverage 10–25% −0.0096**
(0.0043)
−0.0016
(0.0036)
JSY  coverage 25–50% −0.010**
(0.0049)
−0.0017
(0.0037)
JSY  coverage >50% 0.033***
(0.0078)
−0.010**
(0.0044)
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3.
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses.
All estimates are from a model that includes ﬁxed effects for district and year of birth, 
poverty  line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual control
score,  recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of liv
*
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B
B
B
B
B
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D
D
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D** denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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